The Korean Conflict

OFFICIAL BRIEFING PAPERS

STUDENT NAME: ________________________________________________

ROLE ASSIGNMENT: ____________________________________________
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“Education is our first line of defense. In the conflict of principle and policy which divides the world today, America’s hope—our hope—the hope of the world, is in education.”

— HARRY S. TRUMAN
Seven Roles, One President

1. CHIEF OF STATE
As the U.S. Chief of State, the president is a living symbol of the nation who stands for the highest values and ideals of the country.

Examples of Behavior:
• Presenting important national awards to citizens
• Congratulating U.S. Olympic gold medal winners
• Making a patriotic speech on the Fourth of July
• Pitching the first ball of the baseball season

2. CHIEF EXECUTIVE
As chief executive, the president employs millions of government workers in the Executive Branch, decides how to enforce the laws of the U.S., and chooses officials and advisors to help run the Executive Branch.

Examples of Behavior:
• Appointing the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• Holding a Cabinet meeting to discuss government business
• Reading a report and recommendations about problems in the management of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

3. CHIEF DIPLOMAT
With the help of his advisors, the president makes the foreign policy of the United States. He or she also determines what American diplomats and ambassadors should say to foreign governments.

Examples of Behavior:
• Traveling to London to meet with British leaders regarding European issues
• Entertaining Japanese diplomats in the White House to discuss trade issues
• Writing a message or a letter to Russian leaders on arms control
• Trying to bring peace to the Middle East

4. COMMANDER IN CHIEF
As commander of the nation’s armed services, the president determines the size and deployment of the armed forces and, with Defense Department leaders and the highest military officers he or she appoints, shapes the defense policy. The president shares some military powers with Congress—top appointments, major military expenses, and plans to expand the armed forces require congressional approval; and only Congress can declare war.

Examples of Behavior:
• Inspecting a navy yard
• Deciding whether to bomb foreign cities in wartime
• Calling troops to stop a riot
• Deciding on which new weapon systems to request in the budget
• Ordering troops to Afghanistan
5. CHIEF LEGISLATOR

While only Congress has the actual power to make law, the Constitution gives the president power to influence Congress in its lawmaking—a president may urge Congress to pass new laws and may veto bills that he or she does not favor.

Examples of Behavior:
- Inviting members of Congress to lunch to discuss pending legislation
- Signing a bill passed by Congress
- Making public statements supporting or opposing pending legislation in Congress

6. CHIEF OF PARTY

As chief of his or her political party, the president helps members of his or her political party get elected or appointed to office.

Examples of Behavior:
- Choosing leading party members to serve in the Cabinet
- Speaking at a rally for a party nominee to the U.S. Senate
- Attending events to raise funds for his party’s congressional candidates

7. ECONOMIC CHIEF

The president does not control the economy, but he or she is expected to help run it smoothly. As the economic chief, the president is concerned with economic factors including unemployment, inflation, taxes, business profits, workers’ wages, and the general prosperity of the country.

Examples of Behavior:
- Meeting with economic advisors to discuss ways to reduce unemployment
- Meeting with business and labor leaders on how to avert a possible strike
- Propose a tax cut to stimulate the economy

“You have to know something to be a president. You have got to be a jack-of-all-trades and know something about all of them.”

- HARRY S. TRUMAN
Truman’s Schedule, June 29, 1950

Thursday, June 29th:

9:15 am (Mr. Walter dates) (Come to see Mr. Connally and see the President OFF THE RECORD)

10:00 am (Start meeting)

11:00 am (Honorable Frederick Brandt, Director, Bureau of the Budget (One-half hour)

11:30 am (Honorable Charles F. Fruea, Secretary of Agriculture (called Dr. Connally to ask for this)

11:45 am (Vice Admiral W. B. Bushman, Head of N. A. T. O.

(Arranged by Admiral Daniel, who brought Admiral Bushman in OFF THE RECORD)

12.00 pm (Honorable Edward R. Stett, American Ambassador to Liberia

(In State Department on consultation and asked if he might well before returning to his post at Monrovia)

12:10 pm (George Baldy)

(At End of Session)

12:15 pm The President reviewed group of overseas Explorers at the State Department, engaged in work on the International Information and Educational Exchange Program.

(The group of overseas Explorers are nationals of other countries who are now in the U. S. for two months of orientation and training. These foreign employees of the United States government were chosen from overseas posts for ability and devotion to the United States International Information and Educational Exchange Program. The State Department waited that the President would return.) - LBS ATTACH.

12:30 pm The Secretary of State - Honorable Dean Acheson

(Appointees)

1:00 pm (LUNCH)

1:00 pm Press and Radio Conference

1:00 pm The following confederated with the President:

Honorable Dean Acheson - Secretary of State (and advisers)
Honorable Henry Johnson - Secretary of Labor
Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr. - Secretary of War
Honorable Francis P. Biddle - Secretary of Navy
Honorable George F. Kennan - Under Secretary of Defense
Honorable David R. Bradley - Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Major General Lucius Clay
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman
General James A. Van Fleet
Lieutenant General George Casey
Lieutenant John Foster Dulles

7:00 pm The President left for Dallas (where he attended dinner of Hispanic Committee of Democratic National Committee)

“Being a president is like riding a tiger.
A man has to keep on riding or be swallowed.”

– HARRY S. TRUMAN
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Meeting with</th>
<th>Likely Topic</th>
<th>Role(s) Reflected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:55 am</td>
<td>Walter Gates</td>
<td>He was Bess Truman's cousin. This was just a courtesy call. Note short time allowed for meeting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 am</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Regular review meeting with probably many assignments and topics discussed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 am</td>
<td>Fredrick Lawton, Bureau of Budget</td>
<td>Discussed cost estimates for several budget areas as well as an airbase and a civil aeronautics board decision.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30 am</td>
<td>Charles Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture</td>
<td>Probably regarding agricultural issues.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45 am</td>
<td>E.B. Cochrane, Head of M.I.T.</td>
<td>Off the record meeting arranged by Admiral Dennison.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 pm</td>
<td>Edward Dudley, American Ambassador to Liberia</td>
<td>Probably the traditional meeting between a president and his ambassador.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:10 pm</td>
<td>George Biddle and Donald Dawson</td>
<td>Off the record meeting. Dawson handled appointments and personnel matters for the president. Biddle was appointed to the Commission Fine Arts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:15 pm</td>
<td>Overseas Employees of the State Department</td>
<td>See Truman's schedule.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30 pm</td>
<td>Dean Acheson, Secretary of State</td>
<td>Regular Thursday appointment.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1:00 pm</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4:00 pm</td>
<td>Press and Radio Conference</td>
<td>Some topics included Korea, Mexican loan, funding for Marshall Plan, and statehood for Alaska and Hawaii.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:00 pm</td>
<td>See listing of attendees on Truman's schedule</td>
<td>Major policy discussion concerning Korea, especially regarding Soviet role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:00 pm</td>
<td>Finance Committee of Democratic National Committee</td>
<td>Attended dinner</td>
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</table>
ISSUE: REBUILDING EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II

Millions of soldiers and civilians perished in Europe during WWII. Many survivors experienced starvation, poverty, and sense of hopelessness. Most European nations were in a weakened condition, having suffered great physical ruin (bombed out factories, homes, transportation, and stores) and shattered economies.

The U.S. and its western European allies feared that people would be attracted to communism due to the dire times. The U.S. State Department believed that swift action must be taken to help Europeans rebuild before they lost faith in democracy. In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed to President Truman a $16.5 billion recovery program whereby America will assist European nations in rebuilding after the devastation of the recent war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:</th>
<th>What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Chief of State</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>□ Chief Diplomat</td>
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<td>□ Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>□ Chief Legislator</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Chief of Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Economic Chief</td>
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ISSUE: MCCARTHYISM
(CHARGES OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND SPYING IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT)

In the years immediately following WWI, the U.S experienced the “Red Scare.” Some believed that radicals were terrorizing and actively infiltrating the U.S. government. In the 1930s, some Americans feared that Roosevelt’s policies were leaning toward socialism and that Russia was trying to subvert American institutions.

After WWII, there were many charges that Soviet spies had gained access to U.S. atomic bomb secrets and infiltrated the United States. Pressure was placed on President Truman to weed out federal employees suspected of supporting Soviet communism. He established loyalty review boards and loyalty oaths for federal workers. A Wisconsin Senator, Joseph McCarthy made speeches claiming to have a list of Soviet spies working inside the U.S. State Department. Some accused President Truman of being too lax in guarding United States institutions from Soviet infiltration.

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Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:

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CURRENT ISSUE: 

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<tr>
<td>☐ Economic Chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
MODULE 2: PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S ADVISORS

AUTHORITY, POWER, AND INFLUENCE IN THE TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE:
An Organizational Chart

HARRY S. TRUMAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Commander in Chief, chief diplomat, and chief executive and administrator

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
Assists and advises President Truman on national security.

CHARLIE ROSS
PRESS SECRETARY
Advises and assists President Truman in presenting himself and his policies to the press and the public.

LOUIS JOHNSON
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Advises President Truman on national security policy and directs the U.S. Armed Forces.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
Assists and advises President Truman on national security.

ALBEN BARKLEY
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.
Like all other presidents, President Truman determined his vice president’s role.

OMAR BRADLEY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Senior military advisor to President Truman and Secretary of Defense Johnson.

DEAN ACHESON
SECRETARY OF STATE
Advises President Truman on foreign policy and implements the president’s diplomatic vision.

PHILIP JESSUP
SPECIAL AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Advisory Evaluation Form

As President Truman’s advisor, you must have working knowledge of issues and events affecting the nation and the world. Briefings are being circulated on three issues and events to a limited number of advisors including you. Use the form below to assess the importance of this briefing to your advisory role and then pass the briefing to another advisory group.

**Briefing Title:**

Relevant Information:

•

•

•

Based on my assessment, I believe my advice would have been needed (check one):

☐ A great deal  ☐ Possibly/Not sure  ☐ Not at all

Why? ________________________________

**Briefing Title:**

Relevant Information:

•

•

Based on my assessment, I believe my advice would have been needed (check one):

☐ A great deal  ☐ Possibly/Not sure  ☐ Not at all

Why? ________________________________

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**Briefing Title:**

Relevant Information:

- 

- 

- 

Based on my assessment, I believe my advice would have been needed (check one):

- A great deal
- Possibly/Not sure
- Not at all

Why? 

---

**Briefing Title:**

Relevant Information:

- 

- 

- 

Based on my assessment, I believe my advice would have been needed (check one):

- A great deal
- Possibly/Not sure
- Not at all

Why? 

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This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage act, 50 U.S. C., 31 and 32, as amended. This CIA Situation Report is furnished to authorized recipients only. Transmission of its content to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This CIA Situation Report is designed for use as a reference, analysis and interpretation of the strategic or national policy aspects of foreign situations, which affect the national security of the United States, furnished to authorized recipients only.

* The White House Decision Center has abridged this 1948 CIA Situation Report.
Korea is significant to the security of the U.S. because it is the critical point of contact between the U.S. and the USSR in the Far East. Korea is of little military value to the U.S., but the failure to meet our commitments regarding Korean independence (Cairo Declaration, 1943, WWII) would result in serious loss of prestige. From a long-range view, Korea is important to U.S. security because Soviet control of this area would jeopardize our political aims in China and Japan and would threaten all U.S. security plans throughout the Pacific.

HISTORY

Koreans have maintained their isolation for centuries. Nationalism is a strong characteristic of the Korean people. Japan dominated Korea for forty years, intensifying their desire to eliminate foreign influence. Koreans fought for freedom from Japanese interference from 1919 until their independence in August 1945.

Korea is known as the Hermit Kingdom. Korea’s geographic location kept it in virtual isolation from more powerful neighbors. Korea adopted Chinese civilization from its early history until the end of the 19th century. This allegiance of Korea to China resembled the relationship of a younger brother to an elder brother. In this relationship with China, Korea had sufficient freedom to develop a national culture without ever achieving true autonomy.

Korea is important to U.S. security because Soviet control of this area would jeopardize our political aims in China and Japan and would threaten all U.S. security plans throughout the Pacific.
Korea could not stay isolated forever. Once the geographic barrier was overcome, Korea became the crossroads of international conflict in Asia. Japan and China undertook the first joint occupation of Korea in 1885. China and Japan struggled with each other for domination of the peninsula. Chinese influence tended to be stronger until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1893. Japan demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea. The expulsion of China from Korea was a victory for Japan, and a benefit for the Russians, who controlled the Maritime Province of Siberia.

For a time Russian influence replaced the Chinese. Japan contested control of Korea until the defeat of Russia in 1905. Korea kept a form of self-government under the Japan control until 1910, when the Korean king finally abdicated in favor of the Emperor of Japan. From then until its liberation by the Allies in August 1945, Korea was governed as a Japanese colony.

Koreans were generally in opposition to Japan until just before the outbreak of war in the Pacific. As war tension mounted, the idea of Korean independence from Japan became more of a possibility. Factions emerged in preparation for the coming struggle for power. The Korean Provisional Government was suddenly challenged by rival organizations.

Two of the rival organizations in China, the Korean Independence League (KIL) and the one in the U.S., the United Korean Committee (UKC) maintained contact on an informal basis. These two groups began the Leftist opposition to Rhee Syngman the President of South Korea. They ranged from extreme pro-communism in the China group to the “liberalism” of the U.S. group.

Following the war, the USSR took advantage and imposed full-fledged totalitarianism on the Koreans north of the 38th parallel. Soviet strategy for achieving control is to place responsibility for the political and economic welfare on Soviet-recognized representatives of the Korean people. The USSR promptly packed the People’s Committee in North Korea with native communists and organized a police state.

In South Korea, on the other hand, the U.S. Military Government had established policies to relieve the wants of the people while educating them for eventual independence and self-government. The Military Government tried to maintain a balance among the Korean parties and guaranteed fundamental liberties.

**Economics**

Korea has historically possessed an agricultural economy. While it was dominated by Japan, it served as the “granary” to the Japanese Empire. During the 1930’s, with the Asiatic expansion, Japanese money and technology were used in Korea to build a wartime industrial superstructure. The proximity to the bituminous coal resources of North China and Manchuria along with the peninsula's abundant supply of waterpower, iron ore, and anthracite coal created the basis for Korean industrial development.

Japan’s exploitation of the Korean economy had a direct bearing on Korea’s present economic plight. The peninsula was developed not as a self-sustaining economic unit, but as an integral part of the Japanese Empire development. The expansion of industry was carried out in terms of its wartime potential, and the Japanese heavily subsidized many Korean factories and mines. These enterprises would not be expected to operate as peacetime ventures.

Agriculturally and industrially, Korea was operated as a business for Japan’s financial and material gain. Little regard was ever given for the welfare of the Korean people. Native Koreans were not trained in technology to any significant extent. Korean industry was almost completely dependent upon Japan for managerial talent, capital equipment, and technical experience. Moreover, in the later stages of World War II, Korea’s agricultural and industrial assets were laid to wholesale waste and despoliation* by the Japanese.

*De-spoil v. to deprive of possession by force, plunder
Korea thus emerged from the War with a nearly flat economy. Its soil and forests were seriously impoverished. Its industry, transportation and communications were in a desperate state of deterioration and obsolescence. The financial structure had been nearly destroyed by the flood of currency issued by the Japanese prior to the surrender. The bulk of Korea’s foreign trade, which had been with Japan, disappeared almost overnight.

The arbitrary division of the peninsula into Soviet and U.S. Zones has compounded post-war problems in Korea. Immediate problems of preventing disease and unrest, as well as the longer-range problem of economic rehabilitation are in need of attention. Hydroelectric power facilities, chemical (particularly fertilizer), metal, and mining industries of the North form a much-needed complement to the agriculture and textile industry that dominate in southern Korea.

Conditions needed to revive agricultural production would include an adequate supply of fertilizers to southern Korea (supplies must be imported as long as the Soviets continue to withhold fertilizer surpluses manufactured in the North). Rehabilitation of Korea’s badly rundown transportation system is also an immediate need.

Long-range measures are also needed, including reforestation, flood control, extension of acreage under cultivation, and completion of irrigation projects that were started by the Japanese. Any agricultural revival must reform the feudalistic land-holding system. Soviet land reform efforts in the North have been largely ineffective due to their excessive farm taxes. Land reform in the South is still in the planning stage.

The country’s 14,000 miles of highways, serving as essential feeders to the cities and railroads, must also be rehabilitated. In South Korea, such essential construction items as asphalt and cement must be imported in quantity, since the concentration of Korea’s asphalt and cement plants are north of the 38th parallel. In the Soviet zone, according to reports dated May 1947, highways are being well maintained and an extensive road repair program using compulsory labor has been instituted.

NATURAL RESOURCES

With the exception of waterpower, the country’s most important natural asset, Korea is not richly endowed with natural resources. Most of its mineral wealth and waterpower is located in the northern zone. Between 80% and 90% of Korea’s hydroelectric power is generated by plants in North Korea. The whole electric power complex in Korea suffers from a lack of maintenance, replacement parts and technicians. In their present condition, the power plants are incapable of supporting an increase in consumer demand. The situation in the South is more uncertain since there is no guarantee that the Soviet-controlled North zone will continue supplying the South with power.

Korea possesses coal reserves estimated at nearly two billion tons, largely from the northern zone. Three-quarters of the reserves consist of low-quality anthracite. Good quality bituminous coal has to be brought in from Japan, North China, and Manchuria. The supplies from these areas are now largely cut off. Likewise, coal for the production of iron and steel and coal for gas manufacture must be imported. Even if Korea returns to its wartime coal production level, and receives large imports of coal from Japan, a serious coal supply problem still exists.

Iron ore resources are also largely concentrated in North Korea. The wartime production rate of 3,400,000 (1944) substantially exceeded iron ore requirements of Korea’s own iron and steel industry.

Both North and South Korea formerly had extensive forestlands. While North Korea is still substantially stocked with timber, most of South Korea’s forestland has been laid waste, largely due to heavy overcutting to provide fuel. Rapid deforestation resulted in serious soil erosion and contributed to the worst flooding in twenty years in South Korea during 1946.
5. Introduce Advisors

[List Advisors Standing with You]

I have asked the following advisors to join me to answer your questions:

• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________

Please direct your questions to the correct advisor.

6. Take Questions

We will now take questions.

[Reporters must raise their hand, be recognized by you, and direct their question to a specific advisor. You may allow each reporter one follow-up question.]

Instructions for Advisors Appearing with Charlie Ross

Determine what remarks you may share with the press in your advisory role and list them below. Remember, you possess classified government information. Consider carefully what you want the press and American people to know.

• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
• ________________________________________________________________
Developing the President’s Plan for Action

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN
Use the response summary form on the next page and your advisors’ expertise to create your response to the Korean conflict.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADVISORS
Help your President Truman decide how the U.S. will respond to the Korean conflict.

POSSIBLE RESPONSES (COULD BE USED IN COMBINATION):
1. Commit U.S. and UN forces to:
   a) Push back and hold North Korea at the 38th parallel
   b) Hold North Korea to the current position
   c) Push north of the 38th parallel into North Korea to reunite North and South Korea
2. Rely entirely on air and navy support and commit no ground troops
3. Use atomic weapons
4. Pull out all military support (do not support UN resolution)
5. Confront Russia and China militarily, economically, or diplomatically
6. Other: _________________________________________________

YOU MUST CONSIDER POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR CHOSEN OPTION FOR THE U.S. SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ARE:
1. Civilians called up for service (the draft, the National Guard mobilization)
2. Rationing of goods (gas, food, iron, clothing, etc.) in the United States
3. Return factories (auto and air) to war time production
4. Direct confrontation with Communist leaders Stalin and Mao Tze-Tung
5. Increase military budget which may result in increased taxes for the US
6. US military fatalities and casualties
7. Cold War victory or loss for Communists
8. Gain or loss of U.S. and UN credibility with other nations
9. Communist expansion beyond Korea
10. Public perception of strength against communism
11. World War III
12. Other: ______________________________________________________

“The most dangerous course a president can follow in a time of crisis is to defer making decisions until they are forced on him and thereupon become inevitable decisions.”

– HARRY S. TRUMAN
### PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S RESPONSE SUMMARY
**TO NORTH KOREA'S INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA**

**Situation:** North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Limited air and navy support has been provided for the U.S. UN resolutions have called for North Korea to end its aggression on South Korea. They have not done so.

How should the United States respond to North Korea's invasion of South Korea?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the best outcome?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What will not be compromised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is not an acceptable outcome?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final recommendation to the appropriate authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determine and assess three possible recommendations with risks, consequences and benefits.</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation:</td>
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Presidents’ Conference

INSTRUCTIONS

Each President Truman should share his/her plan of action. Choose one final President Truman to present his/her plan to the White House Press Corps. (If an agreement cannot be reached on the final course of action because of significant differences in the plans, two presidents may be selected.) Work as a team to craft the final President Truman’s speech to the White House Press Corps on page 46. Do not invent facts; use the information from the video, readings, and briefing.

“A president ought not to worry whether a decision he knows he has to make will prove to be popular. The question is not whether his actions are going to be popular at the time but whether what he does is right. And if it is right in the long run it will come out all right. The [person] who keeps his ear to the ground to find out what is popular will be in trouble. I usually say that a [person] whose heart is in the right place and who is informed is not likely to go very far wrong when he has to act.”

– HARRY S. TRUMAN
President Truman’s Press Conference:
Announcing the U.S. Response to the Crisis in South Korea

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN
Using the organizer below as a guide complete your speech detailing the U.S. response to North Korea’s aggression below. You will then present your plan to the White House Press Corps, and then take questions from the press.

PRESS BRIEFING ORGANIZER FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN

1. Greeting and Introduction
   Ladies and gentlemen of the press, I conferred with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior advisors about the situation in the Far East created by the North Korean’s unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea.

2. Background Information
   To date, North Korea has failed to comply with UN resolutions calling for cessation of hostilities and immediate withdrawal to the 38th parallel.

   Accordingly, I have ordered the following:
   •
   •
   •

4. Reasons
   My reasons for this course of action are:
   •
   •
   •

5. Possible Consequences* 
   I know my actions may have some important consequences for my fellow Americans including:
   •
   •
   •

6. Closing Remarks
   ___________________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________________

7. Take Questions
   I will now take questions.
   [Reporters must raise their hand and be recognized by you before asking a question. You may allow each reporter one follow-up question.]

*Remember to consider domestic, diplomatic, and military consequences.
End of preview.
"I don't know of anything better in the world that a [person] can do that's more helpful to the welfare of the nation than to get the [young people] to understand what they have and what they have to do to keep it, but I try to impress upon them that they didn't get this form of government for nothing. It was gotten through sweat, blood, and tears, the shedding of a lot of blood..., [but] we've still got it. It's still the best government in the history of the world, and it always will be if the [young people] want to keep it up on the basis on which it was founded."

– HARRY S. TRUMAN